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U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540:
An Exemplary Model for a Framework to
Safeguard Dangerous Dams Against
Sabotage by Nonstate Actors
BY IAN ANDREW BARBER
Abstract
The purpose of this research is to explore how an international
framework could be developed in order to safeguard large dams against
sabotage by nonstate actors, such as terrorist organizations or hostile
civilians. The necessity of an international security agreement to manage
dams as a global security threat will be clearly substantiated via an
analysis of three determinants: the possible magnitude of dam failure, the
inadequacies of international law to regulate asymmetric warfare, and
the evolving threat of dam sabotage in the developing world.
Subsequently, various legal components and regulatory mechanisms
from an existing international agreement will be considered with regard
to their adaption in a hypothetical security resolution. Specifically, I will
argue that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 serves
as an exemplary model for an international security agreement to
safeguard potentially dangerous dams from sabotage. This assertion will
be conveyed through a detailed analysis of the resolution’s background,
design, binding nature, role in existing legal regime, political buy-in,
state-level implementation, and compliance scheme. Furthermore,
certain limitations and criticisms of this argument will be intermittently
addressed as they pertain to the aforementioned elements and theoretical
international agreement on dam security.
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Introduction: The Necessity of an International Security
Agreement
Magnitude of Dam Failure
Dam failure should be viewed as a global security risk on account
of the tremendous energy and water stored behind these structures. In
the event of dam failure, rapid and unforeseeable flooding can occur
downstream, resulting in a significant loss of human life,
environmental destruction, and long-lasting economic disruption.1 In
the summer of 1975, a historic amount of rain fell upon the Henan
province in China. The unprecedented rainfall happened to occur after
the Chinese government engaged in years of rapid dam development
during the social and economic campaign known as Great Leap
Forward. The storm caused such intense flooding that the Banqiao
Reservoir Dam, located in the Henan province, eventually collapsed.2
It is estimated that the crumbling of this dam created a moving wall of
water that was nearly 6 meters tall and 12 kilometer long.3 This dam
failure ultimately killed over 170,000 people.4 In comparison, the
United States Department of Energy estimates that the causalities
suffered from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima was around 100,000
by the end of 1945.5 Therefore, one can easily deduce that dam failure
is a high level security risk where the magnitude of devastation rivals
commonly defined weapons of mass destruction. For this reason,
military powers have historically targeted dams as a means to destroy
large population centers during times of armed conflict.6

1. The Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, Hazard Mitigation Plan Section 14: Dam
Failure 1, 1-2, http://www.gbra.org/documents/hazardmitigation/update/section14-damfail
ure.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
2. Eric Fish, The Forgotten Legacy of the Banqiao Dam Collapse, INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS (Feb. 8, 2013), https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/the-forgotten-legacyof-the-banqiao-dam-collapse-7821.
3. Yi Si, The World’s Most Catastrophic Dam Failures: The August 1975 Collapse of
the Banqiao and Shimantan Dams in THE RIVER DRAGON HAS COME! 25, 26 (M.E. Sharpe,
Ming Yo trans., 1998).
4. Eric Fish, supra note 2.
5. U.S. Dept. of Energy, The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima, https://www.osti.gov/
opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1945/hiroshima.htm.
6. Marcus DuBois King, The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq, VOL. 40 WASH.
QUART. Rev. 53, 15556 (2016).
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Inadequacies of International Law
Since the Banqiao Dam catastrophe, dams have been defined in
Article 56 of Protocol I amendment protocol to the Geneva
Conventions as “installations containing dangerous forces.”7 Article
56 of Protocol I pertains to the protection of works and installations
containing dangerous forces in international armed conflicts. It states
that dams “shall not be made the object of attack, even where these
objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of
dangerous forces and consequence severe losses among the civilian
population.”8 This prohibition is similarly stated in Article 15 of
Protocol II, which regulates noninternational armed conflicts.9 An
appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1997 urged
nations who had not yet ratified the Additional Protocols to quickly do
so given their universal scope as customary international law,
regardless of whether a state actually ratified the instruments.10 These
Additional Protocols are complemented by the 1976 Convention on
the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques. The convention states that contracting
parties may not engage in “any hostile use of environmental
modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to another state
party.”11
Yet, the legitimacy of Article 56 of Protocol I as customary
humanitarian international law is directly challenged by the world’s
most capable militaries. For instance, the United States have since
refused to ratify Protocol I, which critics argue has hindered the
widespread application of these international laws and norms.12
American opposition to Protocol I is perhaps unsurprising when
7. International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=opendocum
ent &documentId=3376730ECD9DF7B1C12563CD0051DD37 (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Cornelio Sommaruga, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 320 (Oct. 31,
1997). https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jnux.htm.
11. International Committee of the Red Cross, Convention on the Prohibition of Military
or any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, https://ihl-data
bases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/460 (Dec. 10, 1979).
12. Jason Gehrig & Mark M. Rogers, Water and Conflict: Incorporating Peacebuilding
into Water Development 5153 (Catholic Relief Services, 2009), https://www.crs.org
/sites/default/files/tools-research/water-and-conflict.pdf.
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considering that the United States has historically targeted dams
and other forms of infrastructure during the Korean and Vietnam
Wars.13 While one might rush to define such action as a flagrant
disregard for international law, these military tactics were
undertaken before Protocol I came into existence.14 It should also
be taken into account that world powers who often engage in
international armed conflicts have more of an incentive to reject
codified limitations on their abilities given the increasingly
complex nature of war. For example, the United States concluded
that Protocol I should not be ratified due to specific concerns about
it limiting the abilities of the U.S. military to combat terrorism, and
not because it objected to the overarching components of the
protocol.15 Regardless, according to Jason Gehrig and Mark M.
Rogers in Water and Conflict, Protocol I still carries “considerable
moral weight during war, and serves as a means for demanding
more humane behavior in times of armed conflict between states.”16
The moral weight of this protocol as international law may be
supported through an investigation of the controversy surrounding
Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam. The construction of this dam,
the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa, has sparked tension
between Ethiopia and Egypt.17 The main points of contention
surrounding this hydroelectric dam are Egyptian concerns that the
structure will reduce their historically large portion of the Nile’s
flow and cause damage to the Egyptian economy.18 A number of
Egyptian politicians have even called for covert military action to
sabotage the dam. Despite failed efforts by basin countries to
include Egypt in joint management of the Nile, as prescribed by

13. WARD THOMAS, THE ETHICS OF DESTRUCTION: NORMS AND FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 15253 (Cornell University Press, 1st ed. 2001).
14. Id.
15. The White House, A Message from the President of the United States regarding Protocol
II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, Jan. 29, 1987, https://casebook.icrc.org/casestudy/united-states-president-rejects-protocol-i.
16. Jason Gehrig & Mark M. Rogers, supra note 11, at 53.
17. Patrick Kingsley, Nile Dam Study Fails to Stem the Tide of Egyptian Indignation
Towards Ethiopia, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 16, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2014/apr/16/nile-dam-study-egyptian-indignation-ethiopia.
18. Scott McKenzie, International Water Law – Preventing Conflict on the Nile, OPINIO
JURIS, July 16, 2013, http://opiniojuris.org/2013/07/16/emerging-voices-international-waterlaw-preventing-conflict-on-the-nile/.
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Article 24 of the 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention,19 no
sabotage attempts have been made to date.20 While the absence of
military action or clandestine sabotage is likely due to a number of
factors, this conflict nonetheless represents state adherence to
international humanitarian law and specifically to Article 56 of
Protocol I.
Although adherence to international humanitarian law has been
widely observed by nation states, non-state actors such as ISIS, Boko
Haram, and Al-Qaida blatantly disregard the law of armed conflict and
international humanitarian law by committing mass executions and
widespread attacks on civilians.21 The United Nations Security
Council has increasingly called upon armed nonstate actors to begin
respecting international law, but this has not translated into a
significant change in behavior.22 In fact, many argue that the Geneva
Conventions and other sources of the law of armed conflict and
international humanitarian law do not properly manage asymmetric
conflict involving states and nonstate actors of varying capabilities
and objectives.23 This concept is furthered by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, who have explicitly acknowledged that
international humanitarian law only regulates armed conflict between
“parties.” Parties include states, national liberation movements, or
other armed groups that have a certain organized structure.24 The
Special Court for Sierra Leone has reaffirmed this distinction in 2004,
when it held that nonstate actors must abide by international
humanitarian law if the group is organized and fighting has reached a
certain level of intensity.25 Still, much of the violence now
19. G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. Convention on the Law of the Nonnavigational Uses of
International Watercourses (May 21, 1997).
20. Patrick Kingsley, supra note 16.
21. Lyal S. Sunga, Can International law Meet the Challenges of Today’s Lawless
Conflicts, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 15, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/global-develop
ment -professionals-network/2015/nov/14/international-law-yemen-syria-isis-conflict.
22. STUART CASEY-MASLEN, WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
171 (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
23. Toni Pfanner, Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law
humanitarian action, VOL. 87, NO. 857 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 158, 160 (March 2005),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_857_pfanner.pdf.
24. International Committee of the Red Cross, International humanitarian law and
terrorism: questions and answers (Jan. 1, 2011) https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/docu
ments/faq/terrorism-faq-050504.htm#Dosomeaspectsofthefightagainstterrorismamounttoatra
nsnationalarmedconflict.
25. STUART CASEY-MASLEN, supra note 21, at 172.

11/17/2017 12:49 PM

104

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 41:1

surrounding domestic and international armed conflicts throughout the
world involve isolated attacks, either by loosely organized groups or
individuals that may fall outside these definitions.26 In essence,
international law has proven to be a rather inadequate means of
ensuring that nonstate actors abide by international norms and
humanitarian law. This is largely because modern warfare has
evolved to a point where the existing international framework does not
clearly define which emerging entities are subject to international law.
There is also a clear indication that certain actors may not abide by
international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict
regardless of clear and codified obligations under international law.
Evolving Threat of Dam Sabotage in the Developing World
Rapid urbanization, population growth, and environmental
concerns like climate change have increased demands by
governments and international agencies for hydroelectric power in
the developing world.27 As documented by the International
Energy Agency, there has been a notable resurgence in large dam
construction within the past few years as developing nations devote
themselves towards sustainable development.28 This trend may be
observed in areas such as Central America, where officials have
increased hydroelectric dam construction because of the U.N.’s
Framework Convention on Climate Change Kyoto Protocol Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM).29 This mechanism, as defined in
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, enables developing nations to
construct emission reduction projects, like hydroelectric dams, and
then sell carbon credits to developed nations with emission
reduction targets.30 On the other hand, there is a growing consensus
26. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 23.
27. George Ledec & Juan D. Quintero, Good Dams and Bad Dams, Good Dams and Bad
Dams: Environmental Criteria for Site Selection of Hydroelectric Projects, The World Bank
Latin America and Caribbean Region Sustainable Development Working Paper 16
(November 2003), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/LACEXT/Resources/258553-112325
0606139/Good_and_Bad_Dams_WP16.pdf.
28. International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2012, 22026 (2012),
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2012_free.pdf.
29. Dr. Kate Brannum, Human Security and the Threat of Hydroelectric Dams, In
Homeland Security 1, 11 (Apr. 13, 2015) http://inhomelandsecurity.com/human-securityand-the-threat-of-hydroelectric-dams/.
30. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
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that the construction of large dams is not compatible with
sustainable development due to negative social and environmental
impacts.31 Regardless of these contrasting perspectives, I argue that
this trend towards large dam construction is particularly concerning
because many developing nations have neither the proper legal
mechanisms nor capabilities to ensure the security of these
structures.
For example, in August 2014 an unrecognized state and terrorist
group, known as ISIS, was able to capture the 3.2-kilometer-long Mosul
Dam in Iraq.32 One could contend that ISIS would be forbidden from
attacking the Mosul Dam since the group’s extensive hierarchical
structure and heightened level of conflict qualifies them as a “party”
under the Geneva Conventions. Be that as it may, ISIS appears to take a
drastically different approach to engaging in armed conflict when
compared to previously active entities that would also be afforded the
protections and obligations of “parties” under the Geneva Conventions.33
Unlike the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) and Basque separatists
(ETA) who had some regard and adherence to codified international
customary law, ISIS and similar groups remain opposed to previously
recognized norms of international humanitarian law.34 This dam
takeover caused officials in the United States to fear that the Islamic State
militants might sabotage the structure and release what would easily be
defined as “dangerous forces” under Protocol I or II of the Geneva
Conventions.35 American airstrikes were called in to combat this threat
and a counter attack led by Kurdish and Iraqi forces was successful in
retaking the dam.36 Without this quickly orchestrated response, the
projected flood wave from sabotage and destruction of the Mosul
Dam would have released a nearly 70-foot wall of water onto the
city of Mosul, and caused extensive flooding in Baghdad hundreds
10, 1997, FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 Feb. 16, 2005.
31. David Biello, The Dam Building Boom: Right Path to Clean Energy? (Feb. 23, 2009),
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_dam_building_boom_right_path_to_clean_energy/2119/.
32. Umberto Baachi, Mosul Dam: Italian company signs contract to repair Iraqi dam at
risk of collapse on ISIS frontline THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, March 3, 2016,
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/mosul-dam-italian-company-signs-contract-repair-iraqi-dam-riskcollapse-isis-frontline-1547157.
33. Lyal S. Sunga, supra note 20.
34. Id.
35. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 7.
36. Felicia Schwartz, Dion Nissenbaum & Nour Malas, U.S. Airstrikes Aim at Islamic
State hold on Iraq Dam, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-air
craft-conducting-strikes-against-militants-at-mosul-dam-1408200303.
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of miles away.37 Some have estimated that this massive wave could
kill as many as a million and a half people.38 The regional and
global ramifications of such an incident would be unprecedented.
The Mosul Dam incident is not unique in our day and age.
According to a 2012 report by the United States Department of
Homeland Security, separatist, communist, and Islamist insurgent
groups have attempted over 25 attacks on dams between 2001 and
2011.39 Not surprisingly, the majority of these attacks have taken
place in the developing world.40 While these attacks were
successfully thwarted or failed to bring about mass destruction,
certain nations do not possess the resources or capabilities to ensure
dam security. The Mosul Dam takeover demonstrates this
assessment, as the Iraqi government was clearly incapable of
ensuring state control over the Mosul Dam from an encroaching
terrorist organization.41 The global security threat posed by dam
sabotage will only become more profound as developing nations
continue to build large hydroelectric dams. Additionally, countries
such as the United States cannot be reasonably expected to halt such
catastrophes on a global level. The magnitude of destruction that
comes with dam sabotage is too great to be safeguarded by any one
nation.
In light of these considerations, it is evident that an
international framework is required to effectively prevent non-state
actors from sabotaging large dams and using them as weapons of
mass destruction. Throughout the rest of this paper, I will present
an argument as to why the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540 serves as an ideal model for such a hypothetical
security agreement. This thesis will be conclusively supported
through a comprehensive examination of the background, design,

37. The New York Times, Iraq’s Biggest Dam Could Collapse at Any Time, Killing
Thousands, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/world/middle
east/iraqs-biggest-dam-could-collapse-at-any-time-killing-thousands.html?_r=0.
38. Dexter Filkins, A Bigger Problem Than ISIS?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 2, 2017,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/02/a-bigger-problem-than-isis.
39. Department of Homeland Security, Worldwide Attacks Against Dams 9 (2012),
http://www.cowarn.org/uploads/news/Worldwide%20Attacks%20against%20Dams%20-%2
02012.pdf.
40. Id. at 1011.
41. Jeremy Bender, Isis Has Seized Iraq’s Largest Dam, And What Happens Next is
Critical, BUS. INSIDER, Aug 7, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-has-seized-themosul-dam-2014-8.
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binding nature, role in existing legal regime, political buy-in,
implementation, and compliance scheme of Resolution 1540. In
addition, certain limitations and criticisms, including perceived
problems of implementation and compliance, will be addressed to
provide a more extensive understanding of the resolution and its
role as a model agreement.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540: An Exemplary
Model
Background and Design
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 was
unanimously adopted in 2004 by the United Nations Security Council
with the purpose of preventing nonstate actors from acquiring and
utilizing weapons of mass destruction. The weapons of mass
destruction referred to in this agreement include “nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons and their delivery systems.”42 Delivery means
are defined under this resolution as “missiles, rockets and other
unmanned systems capable of delivering” the aforementioned types of
weapons.43 The U.N. Security Council quickly passed Resolution
1540 as a reactionary measure to the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear
proliferation network in 2004, and in light of the September 11 attacks
in 2001.44 Through the adoption of this resolution, the United Nations
Security Council created new legal measures to solve a growing
international security threat. Whereas previous agreements and
conventions existed to halt state actors from acquiring and utilizing
weapons of mass destruction, no comprehensive resolution had
been adopted with regard to non-state actors, like terrorist
organizations.45
Neither unconventional weapons of mass
destruction nor their means of delivery were expressly included in
the resolution.
The overall design of Resolution 1540 lends support to the idea

42. S.C. Res. 1540 (April 28, 2004).
43. Id.
44. Igor Khripunov, A Work in Progress: UN Security Resolution 1540 After 10 Years,
44 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, no. 4 (2014), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/A-Workin-Progress-UN-Security-Resolution-1540-After-10-Years.
45. Department of Homeland Security, supra note 39.
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that this resolution is exemplary in nature and thus a proper model
for emulation in other collective security agreements.
As
previously distinguished, one can see that the framers of this
resolution recognized a particular threat to world peace, and went
about crafting an international agreement aimed at neutralizing this
global security hazard. The agreement design of Resolution 1540
is narrowly focused in a way that it tackles a specific problem  the
proliferation and utilization of weapons of mass destruction by
nonstate actors.46 The specificity of Resolution 1540 is a key
element of its success, as international agreements that are
constructed to be overly broad may not have a significant impact
nor bring about a change in state behavior. For instance, the narrow
focus of the Montreal Protocol has been deemed as an essential
component to its success.47 By focusing exclusively on eliminating
certain substances that depleted the ozone layer, the protocol was
successful in phasing out CFCs. In more recent times, scientists
have argued for and agreed upon an expansion in the scope of the
Montreal Protocol in 2016 in order to dramatically reduce the
effects of climate change.48 However, this expansion may prove to
be less successful when compared to the rapid and unquestionable
efficacy of the original agreement. When considering the overall
design of a hypothetical security agreement to safeguard dams, the
inclusion of additional or unrelated dangerous structures might be
met with contention by international policy makers who fear that
expanding the scope might detract from its original objective.
Furthermore, as argued by Leslie Johns in Depth Versus Rigidity
in the Design of International Trade Agreements, “depth and rigidity
affect the stability of the cooperative regime  the ability of the regime
to endure.”49 Despite referring to international trade agreements, this
statement is analogous when applied to other types of international
agreements. International financial accords, including specific G20

46. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 42.
47. Emily O’Brien & Richard Gowan, What Makes International Agreements Work:
Defining Factors for Success 3, 12 (Center for International Cooperation 2012), https://
www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7839.pdf.
48. G. Velders, A. Ravishankara, M. Miller, M. Molina, J. Alcamo, J. Daniel, D. Fahey,
S. Montzka, S. Reimann, Preserving Montreal Protocol Climate Benefits by Limiting HFCs,
SCIENCE VOL. 335 (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.igsd.org/documents/Science-2012-Velders922-3.pdf.
49. Leslie Johns, Depth Versus Rigidity in the Design of International Trade Agreements,
Vol. 26 (3) J. THEO. POL. 468, 469, (2014), http://www.lesliejohns.me/DvR .pdf.
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decisions during times of financial crisis, have largely been successful
because of their narrow focus and deep obligations; whereas certain
human rights treaties crafted by the United Nations have been seen as
shallow and problematic.50 American law professor Eric Posner has
argued that agreements such as the Convention Against Torture have
banned the practice of torture on paper but that “Governments in some
150 countries (out of about 193 U.N. members) use torture, not much
different from when the treaty went into force in 1987.”51 Similar
claims may be made concerning the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights or the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women.52 If one were to consider the
design and scope of a hypothetical security resolution on safeguarding
dangerous dams from non-state actors, Resolution 1540 would serve
as an excellent model. As demonstrated, the resolution was crafted in
a manner that avoids the ineffectiveness seen in other frameworks. It
also mirrors the narrow focus and depth of accords that have proven
to be successful, stable, and effective in changing behavior.
Binding Nature
Daniel Bodansky in his work Legally Binding Versus NonLegally Binding Instruments, indicates how “formulating an
agreement in legally binding terms signals stronger commitment . . .
and it can serve as a stronger basis for domestic and international
mobilization.”53 Accordingly, the binding nature of Resolution 1540
is an essential component to the resolutions’ success, and reinforces
its role as a model international agreement for a hypothetical collective
security resolution on dams. Resolution 1540 was adopted by the
United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter. In adopting the resolution in this manner, it imposes
binding obligations on all member states,54 requiring them to take a
number of steps in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
50. Emily O’Brien & Richard Gowan, supra note 47.
51. Kenneth Roth & Eric Posner, Dec. 28, 2014, Have Human Rights Treaties Failed?,
N.Y. TIMES, DEC. 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/28/have-hu
man-rights-treaties-failed.
52. Id.
53. Daniel Bodanksy, Legally Binding Versus Non-legally Binding Instruments in
TOWARDS A WORKABLE AND EFFECTIVE CLIMATE REGIME 155, 15556 (Scott Barrett, Carlo
Carraro, & Jaime de Melo eds., 2015).
54. U.N. Charter art. 103.
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destruction.55 For instance, OP1 of the resolution dictates that states
“shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors
that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport,
transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their
means of delivery.”56 OP2 then articulate how states must adopt
national legislation to prohibit the aforementioned regulations, and
OP3 requires the enforcement of domestic controls, like border
control, to prevent proliferation.57
These binding commitments were crafted as a means of fostering
legitimate international cooperation, but not all binding agreements
bring about serious collaboration.
The Clean Development
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol was created for developed nations
to satisfy their binding national emissions targets.58 In spite of these
binding commitments for developed nations, developing countries
were not included in establishing binding commitments, contributing
to the ineffectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol.59 This suggests that the
binding nature of Resolution 1540 is not necessarily exemplary.
Instead, it is the universality of the resolutions’ binding nature that
establishes it as a model for a hypothetical security agreement.
In addition, Resolution 1540 does not indicate how states should
go about meeting the obligations of the resolution, but instead only
addresses what the states are required to do.60 It is common to think
of binding agreements as precise in nature with clearly indicated
means for satisfying enumerated obligations. Yet, legal instruments
like Resolution 1540 can be binding and still provide states flexibility
in achieving goals, whereas nonbinding accords can be extremely
precise in how a state should satisfy obligations.61 This component of
the resolution is particularly important for a hypothetical resolution on
55. Dr. Berhanykun Andemicael, UNSC Resolution 1540 and Strengthening Nuclear
Security 3 (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/transparency-and-outreach/out
reach-events/pdf/expert-presentation-2010-2-austria.pdf.
56. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 42.
57. Id.
58. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 Feb. 16, 2005.
59. Emily O’Brien & Richard Gowan, supra note 47.
60. Hanne Veel, A Brief History of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
in light of the 2016 Comprehensive Review, Background Paper No. 18/2016, INT. LAW AND
POL. INST. (June 13, 2016), http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=5264.
61. Daniel Bodanksy, Legally Binding Versus Non-legally Binding Instruments in
TOWARDS A WORKABLE AND EFFECTIVE CLIMATE REGIME 155, 159-160 (Scott Barrett, Carlo
Carraro, & Jaime de Melo eds., 2015).
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dam security as it attempts to offsets sovereignty concerns. It manages
to do so while simultaneously requiring sovereign states to change
their behavior through the enactment of specific domestic
legislation.62 This is evidenced by Laos, who despite voicing some
concerns over sovereignty, still supported the resolution.63
Furthermore, countries like the United States decided to cosponsor the
resolution.64 One might find this especially odd since the United
States has refused to ratify a number of treaties over sovereignty
concerns.65 For example, the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court was signed by the United States in 2000. However,
the United States would later write to the U.N. Secretary in 2002
indicating that they did not want to become a party to the treaty, and
consequently relinquished themselves of any legal obligations.66
Fortunately for the international community, state actors have
historically been known to cooperate in order to confront problems
that would typically require a joint effort.67 The international security
threat presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
by nonstate actors is certainly a threat requiring joint effort and
binding obligations. Along the same lines, dam sabotage by non-state
actors requires cooperation and specific obligations since the
consequences of such sabotage have global ramifications.
Consequently, the universal binding nature of Resolution 1540
supports its role as an exemplary model for the proposed hypothetical
security resolution.
Role in Existing Legal Regime
As argued by Emily O’Brien and Richard Gowan in What Makes
International Agreements Work: Defining Factors for Success, a
62. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 42.
63. U.N. District General, Note Verbale from Permanent Mission of the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Chariman of the Committee, UN
document S/AC.44/2004/(02)/117 (May 4 2005).
64. Veel, supra note 60.
65. JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 34957 (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
66. Letter from John R. Bolton, Press Statement, to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
(May 6, 2002) (on file with U.S. Department of State), https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
67. JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 30
(Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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successful international agreement should “fit well with existing
international regimes and institutions.” Resolution 1540 is an ideal
model for a hypothetical security resolution to safeguard large dams
from sabotage by nonstate actors because it satisfies these terms,
especially with regard to its role in the existing nonproliferation
regime. Resolution 1540 reinforces existing international law, as
opposed to replacing it. The resolution compliments treaties such as
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and
Chemical Weapons Convention, as these were deemed to be integral
components to the preexisting nonproliferation regime.68 Resolution
1540 not only compliments the existing regime, but also explicitly
states that it does not alter or conflict with obligations specified in
others treaties in the regime.69
The previously existing
nonproliferation regime could be described as one with glaring holes
that did not sufficiently address the evolving fundamental threats to
proliferation, including the acquisition and utilization of weapons of
mass destruction by terrorist organizations.70 One can draw direct
parallels between the problems of the earlier nonproliferation regime
and the inadequacies of codified customary international law in
preventing dam sabotage by nonstate actors. In fact, a hypothetical
security resolution on dam security could even fit within the existing
nonproliferation regime, as it would represent a simple expansion, but
not drastic modification of the regime. Adding dam sabotage as a
means of delivering a weapon of mass destruction under the
definitions specified in Resolution 1540 would allow the hypothetical
agreement to easily fit within the resolution. The hypothetical
resolution could also be a stand-alone agreement within the existing
regime.
The U.N. Security Council, an existing institution composed of
the most powerful nations in the world, crafted resolution 1540.71 The
forum and institution that is chosen for negotiations plays an integral
role in shaping the rules of international agreements.72 If the proposed
agreement on dam security were to be adopted by this existing
institution and legal regime, the institutional imprimatur behind the
resolution might convince non-state actors like ISIS to finally obey the
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Igor Khripunov, supra note 44, at 3942.
S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 42.
Igor Khripunov, supra note 44, at 39.
U.N.S.C. Current Members (2016/2017) http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/.
Emily O’Brien & Richard Gowan, supra note 47.

4. Ian Andrew Barber - UN Resolution 1540 ready for production (1) (1).docx

2018]

11/17/2017 12:49 PM

UN Security Council Resolution 1540: An Exemplary Model

113

law. Nonstate actors would find it increasingly more difficult to
transgress international law through dam sabotage if every nation was
required to implement certain domestic protections for these
structures. In addition, taking action that directly flies in the face of
the U.N. Security Council might disincentivize dangerous non-state
actors because unlike the UN Security Council, unlike the Red Cross,
has the means to punish transgressors. The U.N. Security Council
approved military action against Libya in 2011 through Resolution
1973, where a limited military response by the United States, France,
and Great Britain brought about the end of the Qaddafi regime within
a matter of months.73 It can be presumed that a cooperative military
response from the council would minimally require nonstate actors to
heavily weigh the ramifications of dam sabotage.

Political Buy-In
Another reason that Resolution 1540 is an ideal international
agreement on which to base a hypothetical security resolution is
because its adoption was a reflection of legitimate political buy-in.
What Makes International Agreements Work highlights this issue by
noting that the success of an international agreement requires
legitimate political buy-in with a high degree of consent early on in
the process.74 In other words, successful international agreements
require parties to an agreement to see the benefit in their involvement
or sacrifice during the initial stage of negotiations. Political buy-in
and consent could be effectively determined by evaluating whether the
agreement reflects political trends that already exist within key
states.75 Resolution 1540 was adopted during a time when world
powers discovered that terrorist organizations were actively pursuing
nuclear proliferation, and decided to take swift action to combat the
threat on a global scale with binding requirements.76 The United
States took an aggressive role in sponsoring and advocating for the
73. Larry Everest, The Fall of the Qaddafi Regime in Libya. The Hand of the U.S. and
NATO, GLOBAL RESEARCH CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION, Aug. 31, 2011,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-fall-of-the-qaddafi-regime-in-libya-the-hand-of-the-u-sand-nato/26304.
74. Emily O’Brien & Richard Gowan, supra note 47.
75. Id.
76. Igor Khripunov, supra note 44, at 39.
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adoption of Resolution 1540,77 and the administration under George
W. Bush may be directly credited with creating the necessary political
buy-in to pass the resolution, evidenced by a unanimous adoption.78
Likewise, our hypothetical security agreement also reflects preexisting
trends because the United States has been actively engaged in
assessing risks from the Mosul Dam for nearly a decade.79 What is
more, the Italian government has also taken an active role by sending
soldiers and engineers to protect the Mosul Dam in 2016.80 Continued
American and Italian involvement demonstrates a distinct and ongoing
trend by world powers in providing dam security to the developing
world. Given this trend, Resolution 1540 serves as an exemplary
model for our hypothetical resolution on dams because it demonstrates
that a similar resolution could be adopted with adequate initiative and
sponsorship by a U.N. Security Council member.
Political buy-in might be assumed for developed countries, like
the United States, who unilaterally develop security plans to combat
terrorism within their own borders in conjunction to mitigating
security threats in developing nations.81 An international agreement
that effectively prevents nonstate actors from sabotaging large dams
might actually alleviate the amount of resources spent by the United
States on protecting large dams worldwide. This would create a
significant amount of political buy-in because the expenses and
resources spent on protection could instead be shared by a host of other
nations. In a comprehensive international framework, developing
countries could build their own capacity to combat dam sabotage from
nonstate actors with the help of various developed countries. These
nations might hesitate because of sovereignty concerns and the
perception that this amounts to international meddling with their
development. However, these reservations could be offset by the
77. U.S Department of State, Remarks on The U.S. Perspective on UN Security Council
Resolution 1540; Remarks to the Asia-Pacific Nuclear Safeguards and Security Conference
(Nov. 8, 2014), https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/38256.htm.
78. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 42.
79. Keith Johnson, U.S. Warns of ‘Catastrophic Failure’ of Iraq’s Mosul Damn, FOR.
POLI. (Feb. 29, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/29/u-s-warns-of-catastrophic-fail
ure-of-iraqs-mosul-dam/.
80. GCR Staff, Italian Soldiers and Engineers Arrival to Save Mosul Dam. GLOBAL
CONSTRUCTION REVIEW (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/
italian-soldiers-and-engine7ers-arri7ve-s7ave/.
81. International Institutions and Global Governance Program, The Global Regime for
Terrorism, THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 39 (June 19, 2013), http://www.cfr.
org/terrorism/global-regime-terrorism/p25729.
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developed world simply paying for security or even providing security
upon agreement by specific countries, thus safeguarding developing
nations’ development. Common but differentiated responsibilities is
a prevalent principle of international law and is featured in a number
of modern international agreements. For instance, Article 4 of the
Paris Accords states “ . . . Party’s then current nationally determined
contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,
in the light of different national circumstances.”82 One could argue
that recognizing the varying capabilities of parties and adjusting
responsibilities accordingly would produce a significant level of
political buy-in.
On the other hand, properly assessing interest and consent might
prove to be more difficult in today’s international arena. This is
especially true when considering how an issue could be shared by
nearly every nation, but not result in political buy-in and consent due
to competing agendas like preexisting rivalries and misperceived
national interests.83 The ongoing rift between the United States and
Russian Federation perfectly illustrates this notion. During a press
conference in December 2016, President Vladimir Putin when
referring to the United States noted, “We have a joint responsibility
for the provision of international security and stability, for the
strengthening of anti-proliferation regimes.”84 Be that as it may,
disagreements over Ukraine and Syria have defined RussianAmerican relations for a number of years.85 The preexisting rivalry
between these two Security Council members might undermine even
the best-laid efforts in creating legitimate political buyin for a
hypothetical security resolution.
Yet, the mere existence of preexisting rivalries does not
automatically subject an international agreement to failure. The
exemplary nature of Resolution 1540 is partly due to its ability to
82. U.N. Conference of the Parties Twenty-first session, Adoption of the Paris
Agreement, at 22, U.C. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015).
83. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 192 (Columbia
University Press, 1979).
84. Andrew Higgins, A Subdued Vladimir Putin Calls for ‘Mutually Beneficial’ Ties With
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/world/europe/
vladimir-putin-us-russia.html?_r=0.
85. Damien Sharkov, Putin’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine Claims Nuclear War
Unlikely, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 12, 2016) http://www.newsweek.com/putin-new-foreign-policydoctrine-claims-nuclear-war-unlikely-527617.
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overcome existing antagonism. Both France and the United States
sponsored the final version of Resolution 1540,86 albeit French support
for the resolution came at a time of hostility between the two nations
regarding the American invasion of Iraq.87 Still, the intertwining goals
and interests of France, the United States, the United Kingdom,
Russia, and China enabled the adoption of Resolution 1540. These
nations recognized how they would all mutually benefit from the
agreement as each of them faced the threat of nuclear proliferation by
terrorist organizations. In crafting an international agreement to
safeguard dams, each veto-wielding member of the council should be
able to recognize that the benefits of 1540 are analogous to the
hypothetical agreement. Dam sabotage can happen anywhere, but the
interconnected nature of our global economy ensures that a
catastrophic event in one nation would send shockwaves around the
world. President Jimmy Carter in his lecture Negotiation: An
Alternative to Hostility, dissects the issue of establishing political buyin with preexisting rivalries.
In discussing Soviet-American
negotiations, he states “it was desirable to create an umbrella or
general framework . . . so that both sides would believe it possible to
reach their goals and not lose face.”88 Through this quote, one can
understand that political buy-in and early consent in international
agreements might be accomplished by proposing a framework that
allows all parties involved to see the agreement as a means to achieve
their goals. Resolution 1540 certainly fostered this sentiment,
solidifying its role as an exemplary model for a hypothetical resolution
aimed at safeguarding dams against sabotage by non-state actors.
Implementation
In discussing the implementation of Resolution 1540, it is helpful
to first define the concept of implementation itself. As identified by
Kal Raustiala in Compliance & Effectiveness in International
Regulatory Cooperation, implementation can be understood as “the
process of putting international commitments into practice: the
86. Veel, supra note 60.
87. Paul Belkin, France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French
Relations, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 2 (Apr. 4, 2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row
/RL32464.pdf.
88. PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, NEGOTIATION: THE ALTERNATIVE TO HOSTILITY 15
(Mercer University Press, 1984).
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passage of domestic legislation, promulgation of regulations, creation
of institutions, and enforcement of rules.89 A special committee has
overseen the implementation of Resolution 1540, including the
adoption of domestic laws and establishment of domestic controls. It
is referred to as the 1540 Committee, a subsidiary body of the United
Nations Security Council, which is comprised of various security and
legal experts.90 It was established under Resolution 1540 and later
expanded under Resolution 1977. In 2011, Resolution 1977 was
adopted by the United Nations Security Council to foster the proper
implementation of Resolution 1540 and extend its mandate.91
Numerous strategies exist for international agreements to ensure
proper implementation,92 but Resolution 1540 and 1977 deal with
implementation through an assistance based approach.93 As opposed
to adopting a deterrence-based strategy, the Security Council
recognized that implementation would be more difficult in certain
states and created a means for states to ask for assistance.94 The
committee works to connect states who ask for assistance with
available sources of assistance: more capable states, international
organizations, and regional organizations.95 The 1977 Resolution
undoubtedly provides an important function for nonstate actors. It
should be noted that international organizations, NGOs, businesses,
and civil society have recently taken a larger role in monitoring proper
implementation of international agreements.96
The assistance based strategy to implementation is especially
important for a hypothetical security agreement on dangerous dams
because developing nations such as Iraq are unfortunately incapable
of ensuring their own security. As illustrated by the Mosul Dam
incident, an implementation strategy that emphasizes assistance will
be best suited for the proposed collective security resolution since it
would give developing nations a means of seeking support from more
powerful actors in the developed world. Only then would these
89. Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation,
32 CASE W. RES J. INT’L L. 387, 39293 (2000).
90. Igor Khripunov, supra note 44, at 40.
91. S.C. Res. 1977, U.N.Doc.S/RES/1922(2011) (Apr. 20, 2011).
92. D. Hunter, J. Salzman, & D. Zaelke, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY (Foundation Press, 4th edition, 2011) 364.
93. Igor Khripunov, supra note 44, at 40.
94. S.C. Res. 1977, supra note 91.
95. Igor Khripunov, supra note 44, at 41.
96. D. Hunter, J. Salzman, & D. Zaelke, supra note 92, at 364.
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nations be able to safeguard dams from sabotage by nonstate actors.
In North America alone, countries such as the Bahamas, Belize, and
Guatemala have asked for assistance in effectively implementing
Resolution 1540, whereas Canada and the United States have extended
their support.97 One would assume a similar level of cooperation and
assistance could emerge in the implementation of the hypothetical
security resolution.
Establishing common but differentiated
responsibilities in this new framework could incentivize nations of
varying development paths, constitutional frameworks, and
capabilities to work together towards a common objective of
preventing dam sabotage by nonstate actors.
Critics have voiced concerns that the likelihood of proper
implementation of Resolution 1540 is precarious due to scale,
resource, and commitment.98 It is undeniable that Resolution 1540 is
difficult to implement, but these challenges have been openly
acknowledged. Resolution 1977 recognizes the task of long term
implementation and outlines specific assistance mechanisms to bring
about proper implementation.99 Furthermore, efforts to improve
implementation are not limited to the 1977 Resolution. During a 2007
committee debate, Japan’s representative expressed a need for donor
states to step in and provide individualized assistance based on the
varying needs of recipients.100 Revisiting the implementation of an
international agreement to ensure proper implementation should not
be regarded as a sign of failure, but instead as a responsible means of
acknowledging limitations and pragmatically searching for solutions.
In addition, the criticism of inadequate implementation might be
overstated. During the first two years of implementation, only 32
members of the United Nations formally asked for assistance in
implementing the resolution, and just 24 of these 32 made specific
requests.101 If one is to consider that this number of states only

97. U.N.S.C. Committee, Note Verbale from Canada on CARICOM’s assistance request,
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) (June 25, 2009),
http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/assistance/states/Canada.shtml.
98. Scott Jones, Resolution 1540: Universalizing Export Control Standards?, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, VOL. 36, NO. 4 18 (May 2006).
99. S.C. Res. 1977, supra note 91.
100. United Nations, Security Council, Security Council Affirms Determination to
Strengthen Cooperation aimed at Countering Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Weapons
Proliferation SC/8964 (Feb. 23, 2007), http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc8964.doc.htm.
101. Scott Jones, Resolution 1540: Universalizing Export Control Standards?, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, VOL. 36, NO. 4 20 (May 2006).
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represents a small minority of parties subject to Resolution 1540,
critique of the resolutions incomplete implementation appears
overblown.
Regardless of this disproportional negative commentary,
addressing concerns of inadequate implementation has actually
reinforced the assertion that Resolution 1540 proves to be an
exemplary model for an international security agreement. One risk
associated with international cooperation is anticipating the future
behavior of treaty parties.102 Flexibility tools and adaptability have
been argued to play a significant role in the success or failure of
international agreements.103 This is especially true of implementation
plans, which may need to be adjusted as a result of changed
circumstances or unanticipated problems. A hypothetical collective
security agreement designed to safeguard dams from sabotage by nonstate actors would inherently require a long-term implementation
strategy as seen in Resolution 1540. The varying responsibilities and
means of implementing the resolution would face similar issues of
scale and resources. Accordingly, even criticism of Resolution 1540
supports its role as a model for emulation.

Compliance Scheme
Compliance in the international arena generally refers to
whether an actor adheres to the specific rules outlined in an
international agreement.”104 Yet, the ability to properly monitor
compliance is largely dependent upon how clearly party obligations
are specified within the framework.105 The universal and binding
nature of Resolution 1540 might lead one to conclude that
measuring compliance with this nonproliferation agreement would
be a simple task; regrettably, this is not the case. As previously
indicated, the mandatory nature of Resolution 1540 only indicates
102. Richard B. BilderManaging the Risks of International Agreement, UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES PAPER NO. 1327 6465 (University of
Wisconsin Press, 1981).
103. Laurence R. Helfer, Flexibility in International Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 176 (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark A.
Pollack eds., Cambridge University Press, 2012).
104. Kal Raustiala, supra note 89, at 391.
105. D. Hunter, J. Salzman, and D. Zaelke, supra note 92, at 371.
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what parties must do, but is vague with regard to how they must go
about accomplishing their obligations.106 This creates problems in
properly evaluating and maintaining compliance. If proper
implementation hypothetically takes place, a party could easily fall
out of compliance if competing national interests within a member
state results in the repeal or modification of required domestic
legislation.107 One would also need to consider how different
national constitutions treat treaty ratification and withdrawal.
Similarly, a country could implement required domestic controls,
as stipulated in OP 3 of the resolution, but fall out of compliance
because they are not able to effectively control their border. A
number of parties to Resolution 1540, including Greece, have been
unable to adequately protect their borders against the ongoing
European migrant crisis.108 One can infer that this would be more
problematic in a developing nation with less resources at its
disposal. While stronger enforcement mechanisms could have been
added to Resolution 1540 to rectify issues of noncompliance, these
mechanisms have been proven to sometimes result in shallow
agreements and limit participation in the agreements themselves.109
Despite these challenges, compliance to Resolution 1540 can still
be viewed as a widely observed phenomenon. As of 2014, over 90
percent of United Nations member states have submitted their
mandated national compliance reports; these reports indicate what
member states have done or are working on to comply with their
obligations.110 The importance of these reports to the success of the
resolutions compliance scheme should not be underestimated. As
demonstrated by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, a number of international agreements place obligations on
states that already comply with terms of the agreement.111 Here,
countries are actually complying with the agreement by changing their
behavior or enacting plans to change their behavior. Adopting the
resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter appears to
106. Veel, supra note 60.
107. Igor Khripunov, supra note 44, at 41.
108. Matteo Garavoglia, Why Europe Can’t Handle the Migration Crisis, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE (Oct. 5, 2015). https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2015/10/05/
why-europe-cant-handle-the-migration-crisis/.
109. Emily O’Brien & Richard Gowan, supra note 47.
110. Igor Khripunov, supra note 44, at 43.
111. Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation,
32 CASE W. RES J. INT’L L. 387, 39293 (2000).
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have brought about a surprisingly level of compliance without a direct
reference to sanctions in the actual resolution. Moreover, according
to Igor Khripunov’s A Work in Progress: UN Security Resolution 1540
After 10 Years, “No institution tasked with addressing an item atop the
global agenda can reach maturity after 10 years.”112 This quote adds
needed perspective to Resolution 1540, and enables one to
contextualize how its current level of compliance is actually
exemplary. A collective security resolution aimed at safeguarding
dams against sabotage by nonstate actors would face similar obstacles
to compliance. Nevertheless, the hypothetical agreement would still
be considered a success if compliance were to be observed on the same
level as with Resolution 1540. The compliance scheme of Resolution
1540 therefore further cements its role as an ideal model for emulation.
Conclusion
The overall objective of this paper is to identify how a
comprehensive international framework could be constructed to
safeguard dangerous dams against sabotage by nonstate actors. To
accomplish this goal, the necessity of an international agreement to
manage this security risk needed to be substantiated. This was
demonstrated through an assay of the magnitude of devastation which
can arise from dam failure, the inadequacies of international law, and
the growing threat of dam sabotage in the developing world. Although
there is no international framework currently in place to address dam
security, upon examination, one can deduce that the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1540 serves as a quintessential model for
such a resolution. This assertion has been conveyed through an
analysis of the resolutions background, design, binding nature, role in
existing legal regime, political buy-in, implementation, and
compliance scheme. Moreover, a dissection of the perceived
limitations and criticisms of Resolution 1540, especially with regard
to its implementation and compliance scheme, actually lends support
to the resolution’s exemplary nature.
There are certain aspects of this argument that need to be further
explored. Future research needs to provide a more detailed figure on
the specific dams to be covered under a hypothetical agreement. As
seen in the United States, dam safety agencies classify dams according
112. Igor Khripunov, supra note 44, at 43.
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to the potential consequences of dam failure in areas located
downstream of the structure.113 The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) stipulates that hazard potential should be based on
the worse-case scenario and factor in the possibility of human
causalities.114 It would need to be determined whether similar
guidelines or other national policies could be applied to an
international agreement. It would also be helpful to distinguish
whether other types of installations containing dangerous forces, such
as dykes or nuclear reactors, could be included in the same agreement.
Despite the need for further clarification, this paper serves a
fundamental purpose in establishing the necessity for an international
security agreement to manage a specific security risk, and then
exploring how the agreement might be modeled. Hopefully, world
powers prioritize this distinct security threat and take swift action in
crafting an international agreement.
Only a comprehensive
international solution can truly ensure that dangerous dams are not
sabotaged by hostile non-state actors.

113. Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEDERAL GUIDELINES FOR INUNDATION
MAPPING OF FLOOD RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH DAM INCIDENTS AND FAILURES FEMA P-946 62 (July 2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/96171edb98e3f51ff9684a8d1f0
34d97/Dam_Guidance_508.pdf.
114. Id. at 5-2.

